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SECTION 301: THE UNITED STATES'




The new Trade Representative has recently described Section
301 of the Trade Act of 1974 as one of her favorite "crowbars" with
which she hopes to pry open foreign markets. Her immediate pred-
ecessor had previously described the Trade Act in a somewhat
more menacing fashion as the "H Bomb of Trade Policy." The
crowbar metaphor is more familiar to me, although either descrip-
tion reflects the importance attached to this particular trade rem-
edy. Section 301 is the one trade remedy which members of the
U.S. Congress most dearly love, and foreigners dearly hate. It has
had a substantial amount of notoriety among our trading partners
and is decidedly controversial. The discussion that follows is a
brief background on Section 301 and a practical and informal
description of how it can be used effectively to promote or hurt an
exporter's or importer's interests.
First, in trade policy, it is critical to understand that every
government and every administration engages in a "choreography
of trade." Trade initiatives are always taking place simultaneously
in the multilateral, bilateral, and unilateral arenas. Traditionally,
the United States has relied most heavily on multilateral endeav-
ors. Currently, for example, the United States has many of its
trade policy eggs in the Uruguay Round basket. The U.S. multilat-
eral endeavor is to achieve trade reforms on a sweeping scale
among the greatest number of U.S. trading partners in a way that
would be most beneficial to the international trading system, the
U.S. economy, and the global economy.
However ideal multilateral reform is, because of the need to
interact with so many different trading partners that may have
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conflicting interests, reform naturally proceeds slowly. Unfortu-
nately, yet inevitably, this slow process results in a lowest common
denominator effect. Reform is difficult to attain when trying to
reach an agreement with more than ninety-six trading partners.
To complement this multilateral endeavor, the United States
uses plurilateral, bilateral or unilateral initiatives. The most recent
bilateral initiative is the U.S. Free Trade Agreement with Canada.
Most controversial of all is the attempt by the United States to use
judiciously, at least in the U.S. view (recklessly in the view of U.S.
trading partners), the threat of unilateral action as a way of in-
creasing the leverage of U.S. trade negotiators in their on-going at-
tempts to open markets abroad. It is neither the United States'
intention to wreak havoc in the international trading system, nor is
the United States trying to undermine the multilateral system.
Moreover, the United States takes no pride when it is forced to
retaliate when confronted by the intransigence of a trading part-
ner. But, nonetheless, unless the United States is willing to act vig-
orously when faced with an unfair trading practice or with a trad-
ing partner who is unwilling to reform (and preferably eliminate)
that trading practice, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) must
act vigorously or else look weak. Further, unless willing to do so,
the USTR will not have the leverage needed to pry open foreign
markets.
As previously mentioned, Section 301 is a trade remedy which
foreigners dislike greatly. Foreign officials, however, ought to view
Section 301 as their favorite U.S. trade remedy, because it has
been the most active force for trade liberalization globally in the
last three and one-half years. No trading partner has liked having
the USTR point the Section 301 gun at them. However, each trad-
ing partner, in turn, got a free ride when the USTR achieved over
twenty trade liberalizing agreements that provided benefits for all
trading partners, not just the United States. For example, when
the USTR persuaded Japan, after a difficult negotiation, to open
its citrus and beef markets, not only were the cattle farmers in
Montana and Texas elated, so too were their counterparts in New
Zealand and Australia. Indeed, the USTR did a great service for
the New Zealanders and Australians. Likewise, when trade reforms
in Europe were achieved, the beneficiaries have not only been pro-
ducers and exporters in the United States, they have also been
producers and exporters of similar products around the world.
Thus, even though U.S. trading partners malign Section 301 and it
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is currently likely to be under attack in the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), U.S. trading partners ought to see the
legislation for what it really is-one of the most vital forces for
opening markets.
Section 301 was codified in 1974 in the Trade Act. Its prede-
cessor was in the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. The Trade Act was
always a rather curious statute because it had two very different
purposes. The first purpose, as already described, is a means of
providing leverage for the U.S. trade negotiators in their efforts to
arrive at satisfactory trade agreements. Once trade agreements
have been achieved, the trade negotiators must urge the trading
partners to live up to the rules. After all, it would be a waste of
time for the USTR to negotiate market-opening agreements if
those agreements were disregarded with impunity. Thus, one of the
major purposes of Section 301 became creating a credible threat of
retaliation to persuade our trading partners not only to enter into
favorable agreements in the first instance, but then to comply with
them.
The second purpose, which often conflicts with the first, is
that it seemingly provides a private access remedy to persons who
feel they are negatively affected by trade barriers by foreign gov-
ernments. Section 301 allows a private party to complain to local
government officials that a foreign trader engages in an unfair
trade practice which has an adverse affect on U.S. commerce by
reducing access to that foreign market. However, once a private
party brings a petition, the government espouses the claim. The
Trade Representative does not initiate an investigation in response
to a private party's petition unless the USTR, with the advice of
and after consultation with other interested agencies, decides to
conduct such an investigation. If the USTR believes that there is a
reasonable case of an unfair trade practice by a foreign government
and initiates the investigation, it becomes a government case. It is
then no longer a private action in which the private party has con-
trol over the proceeding. Obviously, the office of the USTR con-
sults very closely and regularly with the private parties involved,
its private sector advisory committees, and its partners in Con-
gress, principally the Senate Finance and House Ways and Means
Committees.
To reiterate, Section 301 has this dual, often conflicting, na-
ture. It is, in a sense, designed to assist private parties which are
faced with unfair trade practices abroad. It is also a way to enforce
1989-90]
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trade agreements among governments.
Until August of 1988, the objective of Section 301 was to pro-
vide the President of the United States with the authority to re-
spond, when faced with an unfair trade practice by a foreign gov-
ernment or its instrumentality, by taking unilateral action at the
U.S. border. What can the President do if he finds that the criteria
are met? Section 301 does not give the President carte blanche,
but rather authorizes him only to take any action he is already
empowered to take under other constitutional or statutory author-
ity, or to increase duties or impose quotas at the borders.
When is the President authorized to invoke Section 301?
When he finds that a trading partner has violated a trade agree-
ment, such as the GATT, the President can use this authority. If
the foreign government does not violate or deny benefits under a
trade agreement, two criteria must be met for the President to re-
spond: 1) it is either unreasonable, unjustifiable or discriminatory;
and 2) such actions burden or restrict U.S. commerce (a cumula-
tive test).
The foregoing discussion describes the status of the law before
August 23, 1988. As everyone is aware, the United States has had a
long debate about trade legislation. In 1985, when Ambassador
Yeutter, the previous Trade Representative, took office, the U.S.
bilateral trade deficit was skyrocketing, seemingly out of control.
Many Congressmen were concerned that the executive branch had
failed to exercise adequate leadership in this area and decided that
they ought to pick up the reigns of control. As a result, over three
hundred omnibus trade bills were introduced. Many of the initial
bills, in the administration's view at least, would have done far
more harm than good. Many bills were protectionist, with a net
effect of closing markets around the world, rather than opening
them. But following years of debate and constructive interaction
particularly with the Ways and Means and Finance Committees of
the House and Senate, and with other members of Congress, a con-
structive bill emerged in August 1988, which is more likely to open
markets.
On the recommendation of his principal economic advisors,
President Reagan decided to sign the bill. Nonetheless, this did
not mean that the USTR was pleased with all the provisions of the
bill. Indeed, some of the most displeasing provisions were the
amendments to Section 301. For three years the USTR argued
against a number of draconian amendments to Section 301. While
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some were modified, each of the major amendments about to be
described was passed over the USTR's strong objection.
Why did Section 301 fare so badly, when the administration
succeeded in many other areas of the trade bill? The reason was
that in the view of even the moderate and sympathetic members of
the Congress, Section 301 is a response to unfair trade. Congres-
sional sentiment was that the United States must be tough when it
comes to unfair trade. Noticeably, there was a prevailing view in
the Congress that because Section 301 was aimed at unfair trade,
it was fair game for tougher U.S. action.
The problem with this approach is that unfairness is some-
times subjective. Most actions taken under Section 301 have been
in response to violations of agreements, whether trade agreements
or otherwise. Therefore, there is an objective and internationally
accepted basis for deciding whether the practice complained of was
unfair. As a result, the use of Section 301 in those cases has not
been very controversial. This does not mean that the party feeling
the effect of Section 301 likes it; rather, it means that the party
will not decry the United States for gross unilateral action.
Section 301 now authorizes that the practices be determined
unfair-that is, unreasonable, unjustifiable or discriminatory
-even if there has been no breach of any internationally agreed
rules. In the eyes of U.S. trading partners, this gives carte blanche
to the administration to complain about practices simply because
other countries conduct business differently than the United
States. Incidentally, the complaint encountered repeatedly is that
it is hypocritical for the United States to use its economic might
against trading partners only because they conduct their affairs in
an "un-American" fashion.
What, then, were the amendments to Section 301 which, al-
though the USTR dislikes them so much, it will nonetheless en-
force faithfully to comply with the law? First, critically important
authority under the statute was transferred from the President of
the United States to the Trade Representative. The USTR op-
posed this transfer of power. If it had supported this transfer,
other agencies might have viewed suspiciously the degree to which
the USTR was pledged to continue to work collegially with them.
The USTR, however, honestly opposed it because, in its opinion,
the only reason this statute had so much clout in the past was be-
cause the President was the central actor. The political reality is
that no one in the U.S. Government has as much clout and stature
1989-901
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as the President. Therefore, the USTR thought it was unfortunate
to remove the President from the trade equation and to place this
authority with someone of lesser standing, albeit a cabinet official.
The argument on Capitol Hill, however, was that at least there
would be some cases where the Trade Representative would be po-
litically willing and able to take action, although it would have
been too controversial for the President to do so. Thus, Congress
transferred this authority in the hope that it would result in more
frequent and vigorous use of Section 301.
Another amendment even more adamantly protested by the
USTR was a mandated retaliation. Our office, however, scored a
political victory of sorts because the original mandates to retaliate
were very broad and the original exceptions were quite narrow.
The mandate to retaliate, as finally enacted, applies only when
there has been a violation of an agreement. There are numerous
reasonable exceptions, including an exception in extraordinary
cases where the net benefit of action under the statute is out-
weighed by the harm to U.S. economic interests. The effect of inac-
tion under the statute and the credibility of the entire Section 301
program must enter into the calculation. Even so, this mandate to
retaliate, although limited in scope and containing reasonable ex-
ceptions, is a fundamental shift in the law.
Thirdly, instead of simply arguing about so-called unreasona-
ble practices, Congress enumerated several practices of particular
concern. The third major amendment listed export targeting, a
persistent pattern of denying internationally recognized worker
rights (such as the right of collective bargaining or the establish-
ment of a minimum age for the employment of children), and a
foreign government's tolerance of private systematic anticompeti-
tive activities.
There was a final amendment that the USTR supported in
principle, although we argued over the numbers. Now a date cer-
tain deadline has been set for action in all trade cases. This
amendment closes the previous loophole. For cases under the
GATT, the only deadline for action by the Trade Representative
was thirty days following the conclusion of GATT dispute
settlement.
We turn now to how these amendments can be used in Latin
America to a U.S. trader's benefit or detriment. The ways to use
this legislation beneficially are very simple. If a trader is faced with
an act, policy or practice of a foreign government in a market in
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which the trader is seeking to enter, that can be characterized as
unfair within the very broad criteria of Section 301, the trader has
a very powerful weapon. That is, even if no petition under Section
301 is filed, one can use the threat of filing a Section 301 petition
as leverage in seeking to resolve the problem, hopefully without
ever having to resort to any governmental or legal action. Indeed,
the threat of Section 301 action has been immensely important
and useful to many businesses in their dealings around the world.
If filing is chosen, one should give the USTR a draft petition,
which safeguards both the trader and the USTR. From the
USTR's viewpoint, this allows the USTR to get a head start per-
spective on what problem is brewing, and how their resources may
have to be allocated. From the trader's viewpoint, any embarrass-
ment is spared should there be substantial holes in the petition or
critical facts. One should consult the USTR at the earliest possible
date, even before the draft petition stage.
If a petition is filed, one must be aware of several pitfalls.
There is an inherent tension in this trade remedy between private
interests and public interests. The problem with Section 301,
viewed by many, is that even though the USTR has used it very
vigorously and effectively in the last three years, the results are
still uncertain. Nonetheless, it is more perilous for the trader when
the government runs the case. Although exploring this remedy is
urged, one should not count on it. It can be quite useful and is not
very expensive. However, an attorney counseling his client should
make a disclaimer that there are no guaranteed results and also
ensure that the client appreciates the pros and the cons of this
course of action.
On the flip side, Section 301 can inadvertently or unintention-
ally be harmful. Although retaliation is not the central object
under Section 301, it establishes the credibility of the threat of
retaliation. Such threats-so long as they are credible-provide
leverage to trade negotiators. To achieve an objective, one must
persuade an adversary or reluctant trading partner that it is in its
interest, not just your own, to meet your demands. It is the threat
of credible retaliation that adds extra arrows in the quiver. If one
never shoots those arrows, however, then the threat is simply an
ineffective bluff.
The trick then is to decide judiciously, artfully, and appropri-
ately when retaliation is necessary. When retaliation is undertaken
to show toughness, it translates into raising duties or imposing
1989-901
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quotas on products coming into the United States. In the end, it is
the importer who is liable. Every time retaliation ensues, soon after
accolades and praise are received from the members of the Con-
gress, the congressional staff rather sheepishly reminds the USTR
to back off when retaliation results in harm to products produced
by local constituents. The problem is that retaliation hurts. In-
deed, on net it is probably harmful to the national economic inter-
est. U.S. competitiveness is reduced by raising costs for goods,
many of which are not used by the ultimate consumers, but by
industries that use the inputs in making other products or services.
To make matters worse, such industries tend to be angry and mor-
ally indignant because they are, in fact, innocent bystanders in this
process. Although in principle industry regards greater access to
foreign markets favorably, they do not want it to hurt their sales.
In truth, retaliation is a very painful process. Although done
reluctantly in every case, the USTR tries to retaliate wisely. The
USTR conducts public hearings on lists of proposed products to
pick products that will hurt the United States least. Basically, re-
taliation seeks greater long-term benefits that hopefully outweigh
short-term harm. Claiming particularity or uniqueness of a product
does not always work. For example, the USTR recently retaliated
against imports of paper in a Brazil case, but subsequently a major
U.S. company needed Brazilian paper, and could not get it any-
where else.
Another example concerns an American company that uses
Brazilian coffee granules on top of coffee cakes that it produces.
The company later got caught up in the confusion generated dur-
ing the change from the Tariff Schedule of the United States to
the Harmonized Tariff Schedule. While the credibility of a threat
must be maintained, when the USTR is actually forced to retaliate,
there are losers. In the end, this undermines the core of the U.S.
trade policy program and, ultimately, the use of Section 301.
Turning to Latin America in particular, a lot is happening in
the region. Probably one of the most controversial actions was the
recent retaliation against Brazil, raising duties to one hundred per-
cent ad valorem on a list of products, because Brazil adamantly
refused to provide adequate patent protection for pharmaceutical
products. The past, present, and future administrations and Con-
gress strongly support the protection of intellectual property be-
cause of its future ramifications. U.S. comparative advantage is
often in the high technology area. What encourages companies to
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invest in the research and development necessary to maintain com-
petitive vitality is assurances that for a reasonable period of time,
such companies have monopoly rights on the products they have
invented. In the pharmaceutical area, for example, it takes billions
of dollars of research and development to create one product. It
will not be profitable to invest such large sums of money unless
patent rights can be secured.
Before concluding, ethics must be stressed. In the Brazilian
case, there is a perhaps not unreasonable reply to the USTR's con-
tention that Brazil is pirating U.S. intellectual property rights with
respect to the pharmaceutical industry. The USTR asked for re-
forms and threatened action under Section 301. The Brazilian re-
sponse was that what the United States calls piracy, Brazil charac-
terized as making low cost pharmaceuticals available to its poor.
The USTR, of course, responded that in the long term, if piracy is
allowed to flourish, multinationals will be discouraged from invest-
ing in research and development. As a result, new and necessary
drugs to fight diseases of the rich and poor alike will not be discov-
ered and developed. Brazil further replied that it is easy for the
United States, a highly industrialized country, to take a long-term
interest. Developing countries point out that one has to live
through the short term to get to the long term. In the end, they
claim, it is simply a matter of realistic politics-pharmaceuticals
must be available to poor people.
This is an admittedly very difficult dispute. It is not surprising
that the USTR is unable to make much headway. Because the
USTR is adamantly committed to protecting intellectual property
rights, it felt that it had to retaliate and raise duties to one hun-
dred percent. As a matter of fact, the United States had agreed
under the GATT to leave those duties at a certain level, which has
now been exceeded. The increase has led Brazil to charge that such
action violates international obligations under Article II of the
General Agreement. The USTR has consulted with Brazil about
this matter and Brazil may pursue some controversial type of rem-
edy in the GATT.
From the viewpoint of a U.S. trade negotiator, obviously the
United States has to pursue vigorously its interests, which include
the adequate protection of intellectual property rights. The USTR
had to act strongly in the Brazilian situation, because of similar
problems concerning Argentina and Chile. Lastly, the USTR
wanted to set a precedent that the United States simply cannot
1989-90]
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politically accept that piracy is going to flourish in South America
to the detriment of U.S. pharmaceutical and other industries.
Overall, Section 301 is flourishing in the pharmaceutical and intel-
lectual property rights areas in Latin America.
Cases with Argentina point to the viability of Section 301.
Two cases have been particularly interesting. One case was filed by
the National Soybean Processors' Association, complaining that
Argentina had a differential export tax system. Argentine practices
placed a higher tax on soybeans and a lower tax on processed soy-
bean products. The practices naturally had the effects of discour-
aging exportation of the raw beans and encouraging their process-
ing in Argentina, much to the detriment of U.S. soybean
processors. Initially, Argentina promised to eliminate the differen-
tial and ultimately lowered the differential by three percentage
points. But, as is too often the case under Section 301, while Ar-
gentina eliminated the differential by three percentage points, Ar-
gentina undertook a different domestic program that basically
leaves U.S. soybean processors in the same position. In the GATT,
such actions are called nullification and impairment. Although Ar-
gentina did not breach its agreement, it nullified and impaired all
of the bargained for benefits.
A second case with Argentina concerns air courier services.
Sometime ago, Argentina took action such that U.S. air couriers,
such as DHL, complained that there was a prohibition on carriage
of very sensitive documents from the United States to Argentina.
Not only was DHL (the direct party concerned) hurt, but also U.S.
businesses who relied upon DHL for delivery services. Argentina
repealed the prohibition, but a short time later imposed an exorbi-
tant tax with a confiscatory effect.
This case illustrates the kind of difficulties inherent in an in-
ternational trade agreement: no sooner is a problem solved, than it
causes adverse ripple effects in other areas or a new variation of
the same old problem crops up. In the view of the current Trade
Representative, what the USTR wants is not just apparent pro-
gress, but rather results. The USTR does not seek to have illusory
results as in the Argentina cases.
The forecast in the Latin America area is that the USTR will
vigorously use Section 301. Although beneficial for exporters seek-
ing access to markets, it has risks for importers from Latin
America. The fuel for credibility of Section 301 action is import
actions which, unfortunately, can hurt the importers in the short
[Vol. 21:2
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term. Nevertheless, in the USTR's view, the long-term gain out-
weighs the short-term pain.
